A. Introduction
For more than a decade, empirical studies have sought to determine whether nominal interest rates adjust such that real rates are unaffected by changes in the anticipated inflation rate (the Fisher neutrality hypothesis). An unsettling aspect of these studies is the volatility of the estimated interest rate response to anticipated inflation over various sample periods.' Estimates based on data for the 1950s provided low and insignificant values for the response.2 As the sample period was extended, larger point estimates of the response were obtained, finally approaching unity. Carlson (1979) , Cargill and Meyer (1980) and Levi and Makin (1979) produce estimated interest rate responses that decline, often dramatically, when the sample period is extended to include the first half of the 1970s. Peek and Wilcox (1983) find that the inclusion of income tax and aggregate supply shock effects reduces, but does not eliminate, the observed coefficient instability. This suggests other relevant factors remain.
The Lucas (1976) critique suggests that conventional reduced-form coefficients may vary over time due to the dependence of private sector expectational parameters on government policy parameters. Sims (1982) has recently countered that this objection should be regarded as no more than a "cautionary footnote" (p. 108) since policy rules "have not changed frequently or by large amounts" (p. 138). He argues that in fact there has been little drift in (final form) parameter estimates through time. Here we test directly whether changes in policy parameters have produced changes in reduced-form parameters.
We hypothesize that significant, quantifiable changes have occurred in the policy parameters that are especially relevant to the reduced form for interest rates.
We incorporate these para-meters in our model and investigate whether the -1-apparent intertemporal instabil-ity of the reduced-form equation for interest rates can be explained by the changing values of government policy parameters through time and otherwise stable structural parameters.
We address three major sources of change in the government's policy paramet ers :
1) changes in fiscal policy parameters,
2) changes in monetary policy parameters, and 3) changes in financial regulatory policy parameters.
The first category is exemplified by changes in personal tax rates. Peek (1982) presents evidence that changing tax rates significantly affect interest rates and that incorporating their movements substantially reduces the instability of interest rate coefficients. Furthermore, Peek and Wilcox (1984) find that such tax effects are complete; that is, there is no evidence of the 'fiscal illusion suggested by Tanzi (1980 
M=M ÷pe÷yN÷ The two after-tax interest rates are related to the nominal interest rate (i) by (6) and (7):
r* 1* _pe (7) where t is the marginal tax rate on interest Income and pe is the anticipated inflation rate.
Real expenditures depend on the real after-tax interest rate, an investment accelerator term, exogenous real export and real government demand, and real shocks emanating from the supply side. In addition, the presence of the liquidity variable (LIQ) allows us to capture the difference between short-run and long-run IS curves. This difference follows from the assumed differential adjustment speeds in real and financial markets. Since real variables (such as output) adjust more slowly than financial variables (such as interest rates), we hypothesize a steeper (e.g., vertical) short-run IS curve. The liquidity term represents accelerations (or decelerations) in nominal money growth relative to normal. Given an acceleration in nominal money growth, the LM curve would shift to the right and the economy would move from point A to point B along the vertical short-run IS curve in Figure 1 . Movement down the short-run IS curve is captured by a temporary downward shift of the flatter long-run IS curve to IS'.
Thus, this term allows us to capture the well known liquidity effect. If this higher growth rate persists, LIQ returns to its long-run value of zero and the IS curve returns to its original position.
Money demand is hypothesized to depend on output and on the after-tax nominal interest rate, which represents the opportunity cost of holding money when interest income is taxed. The third argument in the money demand function (a) represents a measure of the capital-value risk associated with holding bonds as alternatives to money in wealth portfolios (see Slovin and Sushka (1983) for discussion and empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis). The wage and price equations embody the natural rate hypothesis.
Equation (5) Equations (1-7) can be combined to yield the reduced-form equation for the nominal interest rate:
(?) (+) where X' represents (X -yN) and:
= a0(b+d1)
D 87 =3 , and
The sign of f is Indeterminate a priori. An adverse supply shock reduces investment and real wages and thus the interest rate, while at the same time increasing input costs operating through the aggregate supply equation which raises the interest rate. The investment-real wage effect might be expected to dominate, suggesting a negative value for 86. The results presented in Peek and Wilcox (1983) and Wilcox (1983a Wilcox ( , 1983b ) support this interpretation.
The three policy parameters t, e1, and ai are of particular interest. To the extent that any of these parameters (or for that matter, any of the structural parameters) vary over time, the reduced-form coefficients will also change.
Insofar as the structural parameter in question enters more than one reduced-form coefficient, the B's will covary deterministically. For example, the marginal tax rate (t) enters all of the reduced-form coefficients in the same way. An increase in the tax rate will raise not only the interest rate response to expected inflation, but also all of the other reduced-form coefficients. A decrease in the response of private expenditures to the real aftertax interest rate (ai) will reduce the denominators of all eight B's by the same amount.
However, since a1 also appears in the numerator of 81, the interest rate response to the expected inflation rate will be differentially affected; the decrease in a1 will raise all of the other reduced-form coefficients, while the response to expected inflation will be reduced. Similarly, a decrease in e1 will raise all of the B's except Bi through its effect on D. But, as with al, ei also enters the numerator of . In this instance, however, the direction of the net effect of the change in e1 on is ambiguous a priori.
C. Methodology
Equations (9)- (17) Illustrate the relationship between policy parameters and the reduced-form coefficients. Our hypothesis is that failure to allow for movements over time in these policy parameters has contributed to observed reduced-form estimate instability. We rectify this shortcoming by including values of the time series of the proxies for fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policy parameters. This allows us to test directly for the significance of policy changes in explaining reduced-form coefficient variability and to evaluate whether the remaining, deeper parameters are stable. Incorporating fiscal policy parameter movements requires a measure of the marginal tax rate of the marginal investor, t. If a tax-exempt institution is the marginal investor, the marginal tax rate is zero. If individuals are the marginal investors, the appropriate tax rate is the marginal personal income tax rate. The progressivity of the personal income tax rates makes measuring that rate problematic. As our measure of t, we use the average marginal tax rate on interest income constructed from data contained in annual editions of Statistics of Income, Individual Income Tax Returns (see Peek (1982) ). The tax rate is calculated as a weighted average of the marginal personal income tax rate for each adjusted gross income class. The weight for each class is equal to its share of the total interest received by all income classes.4
A downward drift in the measured interest rate response to expected inflation as the sample period was extended into the 1970s has been noted by Carison (1979) , Cargill and Meyer (1980) , and Levi and Makin (1979) . This may be due to the continuing financial institution deregulation and consequent reduction In disintermediation.
A number of regulatory changes reduced the potential for disintermediation throughout that period (e.g. , the creation of negotiable certificates of deposit, increases in Regulation Q ceilings, the introduction of six-month money market certificates). Such changes might reduce the interest response of private expenditures (a1), thereby lowering the reduced-form coef-5 ficient on expected inflation (see equation (10)).
We allow for changing regulatory policy (and innovation) with a measure of the effect of such changes rather than attempting to quantify the changes themselves. To do so, we take as our regulatory policy indicator, s, the share of commercial banks' and thrift institutions' liabilities that pay market-related interest rates. We assume that the interest response of expenditures is a function of s and DCC:
where DCC is a dummy variable that takes a value of unity when the three-month Treasury bill yield exceeds the regulation Q ceiling interest rate on savings deposits and is zero otherwise. Thus, DCC switches on when disintermediation is likely. The extent to which a1 changes then depends upon the share of liabilities subject to disintermediation. We also allow the IS curve intercept (a) to move during these periods so as not to constrain the IS function to pivot about its horizontal intercept:
In this specification, f(>0) represents the (absolute value of the) interest response of expenditures in the non-disintermediation periods.
During the disintermediatlon periods, the value of a1 will increase. Thus, we expect (f1 + to be positive. Furthermore, we expect the increase in a1 to be larger the smaller is the value of s (f2 > 0). We also expect f4 to be positive in (19).
Similarly, we seek a measure of the time series for the money supply policy parameter, e1.
We obtain an estimate of this series from the following regression estimated with semi-annual data over our full 1952:06-1983:06 sample (t-statistics in parentheses): 1952:06-1970:06, 1970:12-1978:06, 1978:12-1979:06, and 1979:12-1983 D. Empirical Results
Estimates Based on Constant Policy Parameters
This section presents the results of estimating (8) subject to (9)-(19).
When e1, f1, f2, and f4 are taken to be zero through time, constant-coefficient, ordinary least squares (OLS) suffices. These restrictions are equivalent to setting M to equal (M_pe_YN), e1 equal to zero, and a1 equal to a constant. As a result, (8) can be expressed as:
D (1-t)(a1(b1 + d1) ÷ b2).
(23) Tanzi (1980) suggests that individuals have suffered from "fiscal illusion"
by falling to take complete account of tax rates. Peek (1982) , using a (21)- (23) with t = 0) was rejected in favor of the tax-adjusted formulation (equations (21)- (23)) using an index of marginal personal income tax rates. Employing a more detailed model incorporating supply shock and foreignheld bond effects, Peek and Wilcox (1983) reconfirmed these results for the entire 1952-79 period for the one-year Treasury bill rate. We also showed how changes over time in the correlations between the anticipated inflation rate and the tax rate and supply shock variable contributed to previously measured intertemporal instability in the estimated expected inflation coefficients. Further, Peek and Wilcox (1984) estimate a specification similar to (21)- (23) with (1-t)
replaced by (1-Ot), where 8 reflects the degree of (lack of) fiscal illusion.
Using nonlinear least squares, the estimate of 8 closely approximates one, indicating no fiscal Illusion. Therefore, we here restrict 8 to unity, implying complete adjustment to changes in tax rate policies. From (23), it can be seen that (1-t) can be factored Out of the coefficient of each explanatory variable.
Using our tax rate series, we can express (21) with constant reduced-form coefficients when we divide each of the right-hand-side variables by (1-t). The implied reduced-form coefficients at any time are then the estimated constant coefficients times the value of (1-t) for that period. Ml is the nominal money supply. e is the price level expected six months ahead from the Livingston survey data. N, natural real output, is from the Council of Economic Advisors.
(M_Pe_YN) has been detrended by regressing its log on a linear time trend and using the residual as M'. LIQ is the difference between the annualized growth rate of Ml measured from the current to the previous quarter and its four-quarter growth rate up to that previous quarter. X' is the logarithm of the ratio of real government expenditures plus real exports to real natural output. LY is the four-quarter growth rate of real CNP up to the preceding quarter. SS is the ratio of the import deflator to the CNP deflator, adjusted for exchange rate changes. a is the 18-month moving standard deviation of the after-tax nominal interest rate, lagged one month. D7983 is a dummy variable that takes the value one starting with the December 1979 observation.
The June 1980 observation has been omitted due to the presence of credit controls; otherwise, the full sample is 1952:06-1983:06.
The estimates in row 1 imply that rises in expected inflation, exogenous spending, faster real growth, and more volatile interest rates raise rates while accelerations in money growth, higher real balances, and positive supply shocks each lower them. After 1979 interest rates were both surprisingly high and volatile. Row 2 shows that when the post-1979 period is added to the sample, Adding the post-1979 period seems to change the estimated coefficients relatively little. When a time series of the expected inflation coefficient estimate is generated by rolling over a fourteen-year (n=28) sample using the specification of rows 1 and 2, however, a different picture emerges. Figure 2 plots this series. Although these coefficients abstract from changes due to changes in tax rates, they still exhibit considerable movement. In particular, the sharp jump in the series after the 1952 and 1953 observations are eliminated and the early 1970s observations are added to the rolling sample, the downward drift as the sample leaves the 1950s and enters the 1970s, the rise as the sample moves into the second half of the 1970s, and the resumption of the decline as the 1980s observations are included, suggests that major movements are left to be explained.
Estimates based on Changing Policy Parameters
To estimate (8), allowing for variations in monetary and regulatory policy as well as tax policy changes, we substitute (18) and (19) We require an estimate of the numerator of to obtain a marginal significance level on M. To obtain a unique set of parameter estimates when 1952 195k 1956 1958 1960 1962 196t* 1966 1968 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 that numerator is estimated, we choose to normalize the parameter estimates by setting the numerator of to unity. We can then rewrite (9)- (17) 
N=h+hDCC+hDCC/s+he
where the h's and g's are constants.
Allowing a in (19) to change over time requires that we add DCC as an explanatory variable; its reduced-form coefficient is 88. The coefficient g9 applies to D7983 (not divided by D). Our model predicts that h, h2, h3, and h4 are all positive. The sign of h1 may be positive or negative. We anticipate positive values for g2, g3, g7 and g8, and negative values for g4, g5, and g6.
The estimates for the 1952:06-1983:06 sample, omitting D7983, are: the OLS results of Table 1 . The coefficients of particular concern here, however, are those associated with the regulatory and monetary policy parameters, s and e1.
The estimates of their coefficients are both positive and decisively significant, indicating that the reduced form coefficients do in fact respond to regime changes. As e1 falls, i.e., as monetary policy becomes less accoinmodative of real rate shocks, D falls. The response of interest rates to changes in the explanatory variables (except possibly for e) then rises, as the economy is effectively operating with a steeper LM curve. As s rises, i.e., as the share of liabilities which are unregulated rises, D falls, increasing all of the reduced-form coefficients except that on e Due to the effect of s on the numerator of , the increase in s (reduction in a1) will reduce the reducedform expected inflation coefficient. As fewer liabilities are regulated, market interest rate increases induce less disintermediation and less credit rationing.
Less expenditure is deterred by given interest rate increases, generating an effectively steeper IS curve, as hypothesized.
Adding D7983 to this specification (not shown) permits us to test whether the reduced-form coefficient movement that we ascribe to policy shifts remains when a dummy variable for the later part of the sample is included. The coef-ficient estimate of 2.87 (t-statistic = 2.67) on D7983 does indicate that our model still leaves an important part of the recent interest rate story to be told. Our expanded specification has reduced the post-1979 dummy coefficient by one-third, however, and the coefficients associated with e1 and s retain their significance.
The summary statistics listed in Tables 1 and 2 (18)- (20) is rejected at the 5 percent level. This is true for the shorter sample (1952:06-1979:06) as well as for the sample that includes the post-1979 period, either with or without the D7983 dummy. For the longer period, the data also decisively reject the hypotheses that the coefficients associated with monetary policy and regulatory policy individually were zero. Further, the expanded model is statistically superior in-sample to the model that includes D7983 but ignores regulatory and monetary policy changes. Thus, in addition to producing reduced-form coefficients that move as our theory hypothesizes, allowing for structural change in response to policy change produces a significantly improved specification. Is associated with the dramatic decline in e1 attributed to the Voicker regime.
The sharp upward spikes in reflect the disintermediation effects. During potential disinterinediation periods (when DCC takes on a nonzero value), the interest sensitivity of expenditures (a1) and rise. The magnitude of these increases is related to the share of financial institutions' liabilities that pay market-related interest rates (s). As s increased over time, the size of the spikes diminished. After the removal of interest ceilings on large CDs in the early 1970s, the spikes become almost indistinguishable.
Though the two series are not directly comparable, the pattern in Figure 3 broadly mirrors the rolling sample estimates in Figure 2 (with the exception of Ignoring regime changes may have been responsible for spuriously unstable estimates over this period. Our model explains not only statistically significant movement of structural, and thus reduced-form, coefficients, but economically meaningful changes in those parameters. Stability tests conducted over a mid-sample split using the constant policy parameter specification indicate that specification Is unstable. By contrast, when we allow reduced-form parameters to respond to regime changes, the resulting specification Is stable.8 Table 3 show that, outof-sample or in, the 1. See, for example, Cargill (1976) , Wachtel (1977) , Carlson (1979) ).
2. See, for example, Cargill and Meyer (1974) ).
3. This agenda ignores technological changes such as improvements in inforination processing and data transmission.
Though the "deep parameters of taste and technology may vary over time, their shifts are less readily quantified and are outside the range of this study.
4. This tax series serves as an index of the marginal tax rate of the marginal individual, moving with that rate but perhaps not measuring Its level exactly.
5. Gordon (1984) discusses this effect.
6. Test statistics were calculated from the residuals obtained by ordinary least squares from the levels and from the first differences of (20). An alternative we have not pursued is that regime switches occur with changes
In presidents rather than with Fed chairmen. The most discussed monetary policy regime switch clearly seems to be associated with the installation of Paul Voicker as Fed chairman in the middle of the Carter presidency.
7. In Peek and Wilcox (1984) , we found that substituting an expected inflation measure based on prior interest rates did not affect our qualitative 
